Neuronarrative: Power Makes the Hypocrite Bolder and Smugger

The uncomfortable nexus of power and hypocrisy.  Uncomfortable for me.  Contemplating the shakiness of my position could help.

Neuronarrative: Power Makes the Hypocrite Bolder and Smugger: "

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Five experiments followed in which researchers examined the impact of power on the moral hypocrisy of the participants. They found a consistent and alarming outcome: those assigned to the ‘high-power’ group repeatedly condemned moral failures of others while committing unethical acts themselves. In one experiment, high-power participants were asked for their positions on cheating and over-reporting travel expenses, both of which they flatly condemned. They and the low-power group were then asked to play a dice game alone, in a private cubicle, to win lottery tickets. The powerful reported significantly higher lottery winnings than the low-power group, even though both groups had the same odds of winning.

Researchers also examined the degree to which the powerful accept their transgressions versus those committed by others. Across the board, they found that people in the high-power group strongly condemned such things as cheating, under-reporting taxes and keeping stolen property, while finding ways to rationalize committing the same actions themselves.

Perhaps the most interesting part of this study addressed whether the nature of power affected the level of hypocrisy. When participants in high-power roles were separated into those with legitimate power versus those with ‘shaky’ power (in other words, a level of power the individual did not believe he or she merited), researchers found that the legitimate power group consistently displayed more hypocrisy. People in the shaky power group, in contrast, were actually harder on themselves, in a way similar to those in the low-power group. Researchers labeled this outcome “hypercrisy.”

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...the study produced interesting results that provide yet more reasons to be skeptical of those in power with a taste for moralizing.

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Very nice write-up in the Jan 21st 2010 Economist of this very study by Joris Lammers at Tilburg University, in the Netherlands, and Adam Galinsky at Northwestern University, in Illinois.

http://www.economist.com/sciencetechnology/displayStory.cfm?story_id=15328544

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( original study described at http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/News_Articles/2009/galinsky_research.aspx )

But the Economist article ends strangely:

[...] Hypercrisy might thus be a signal of submissiveness—one that is exaggerated in creatures that feel themselves to be in the wrong place in the hierarchy. By applying reverse privileges to themselves, they hope to escape punishment from the real dominants. Perhaps the lesson, then, is that corruption and hypocrisy are the price that societies pay for being led by alpha males (and, in some cases, alpha females). The alternative, though cleaner, is leadership by wimps.

The wording "leadership by wimps" was meant to be read with a "wink", but is indicative of flawed reasoning if one is concerned with a quality of how a competitive organization is managed.

(Firstly, the concept of "alpha males/alpha females" in biology rarely translates into human hierarchies.  "Alpha males" must *always* be vigilant to challenges from any aggressor at any time, with tragic consequences if the alpha male loses - his own offspring may be killed by the new alpha.  In human hierarchies, there are far too many safeguards to the incumbents to make the stakes high enough for those incumbents to earn the title "alpha".  It is pure puffery, in common usage.)

For this discussion, consider "hypocrisy" as "high ranking individuals held to a less rigorous moral standard, low ranking individuals held to a more rigorous moral standard".  Consider "hypercrisy" as the opposite - "high ranking individuals held to a more rigorous moral standard, low ranking individuals held to a less rigorous moral standard".  How will this play out between different competitive organization characterized by differing levels of "hypocrisy" and "hypercrisy"?

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The stress of "hypocrisy" throughout an organization can lead individuals to defensively take on the attitude of cynicism.  Below the highest rankings, the organization is characterized by cynical workers.  These cynical workers will then offer only a fraction of their value to the organization.  And the organization will strain to compete.
On the other hand, "hypocrisy" can be a unspoken bonus to high performing individuals at the upper ranking of an organization.  This bonus can attract and retain the high performers, to the benefit of the organization as a whole.

Benefits to the high performers that stress the organization as a whole should attract a critical eye.  Better to choose a different compensation, to avoid an organization permeated by cracks of social-psychic stress.

"Hypercrisy" along with commensurate compensation of high performers would seem to be optimal.  How to do this?


Do this by fostering through the organization a spirit of:

• High position carries the discipline of high moral rigor and consequence for transgressions
• High position carries the discipline of awe and humility before the scope of the collective responsibility
• High position carries the discipline of awareness of the possibility of a reversal of fortune, and the philosophic outlook that is consistent with high effectiveness in the face of grave risk

So...  Why the comment about "hypocrisy tolerated so rule by wimps avoided"?  Probably because The Economist caters to a Conservative audience, and Conservatives have a bug-a-boo about the charge of hypocrisy.

Image by Akira ASKR via Flickr

And it is a shame, about Modern So-Called Conservatism and Modern So-Called Progressivism.  The Self-Called Conservatives want elites to be shielded from the consequences of their own moral transgressions, and the Self-Called Progressives want the lower classes to be shielded from the consequences of their own moral transgressions.  It is a race to the bottom, and functioning society suffers.
A Neo-Confucianist in the mold of Wang Yangming would lead people from the power of his own elevated moral stature and discipline.  Shame for the degeneracy of our own time and place.

Effective interventions that lead to moral action - here, stopping genocide

Key phrases: "Rwandan radio program designed to challenge norms of deference, legitimize expressions of dissent, and encourage local problem solving and dispute resolution" led to "Our results indicate that although the program did little or nothing to change many domains of individual belief and attitude, it effected profound changes in behavior. Radio listeners in the treatment group became more likely to express dissent with peers and less likely to defer to local officials when solving local problems. These changes were balanced by an increased sense of collective responsibility and local initiative."

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This is important stuff. So little effort is put into effective interventions that lead to moral action - here, stopping genocide.

The Monkey Cage: What Happened During the Rwandan Genocide? And How Can We Mitigate Its After-Effects?: "

Political scientists Christian Davenport and Allen Stam provide an unconventional — and thus controversial — answer to the first question. They discuss this research in the most recent Miller-McCune Magazine. (The project’s website is here.) A few excerpts from the article:

In the end, our best estimate of who died during the 1994 massacre was, really, an educated guess based on an estimate of the number of Tutsi in the country at the outset of the war and the number who survived the war. Using a simple method —subtracting the survivors from the number of Tutsi residents at the outset of the violence — we arrived at an estimated total of somewhere between 300,000 and 500,000 Tutsi victims. If we believe the estimate of close to 1 million total civilian deaths in the war and genocide, we are then left with between 500,000 and 700,000 Hutu deaths, and a best guess that the majority of victims were in fact Hutu, not Tutsi…

One fact is now becoming increasingly well understood: During the genocide and civil war that took place in Rwanda in 1994, multiple processes of violence took place simultaneously. Clearly there was a genocidal campaign, directed to some degree by the Hutu government…At the same time, a civil war raged — a war that began in 1990, if the focus is on only the most recent and intense violence, but had roots that extend all the way back to the 1950s. Clearly, there was also random, wanton violence associated with the breakdown of order during the civil war. There’s also no question that large-scale retribution killings took place throughout the country — retribution killings by Hutu of Tutsi, and vice versa.

Mitigating the after-effects of this conflict is the subject of a new article in the American Political Science Review by Elizabeth Levy Paluck and Don Green. Their jumping-off point is the notion that a “political culture” of deference to authority and conformity helps produce genocide. They seek to determine what can mitigate such a culture by encouraging the expression of dissent and collection problem-solving. They randomly exposed rural Rwandans to a radio program that encouraged these behaviors, and other Rwandans to a program about health. What did they find?

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Our results indicate that although the program did little or nothing to change many domains of individual belief and attitude, it effected profound changes in behavior. Radio listeners in the treatment group became more likely to express dissent with peers and less likely to defer to local officials when solving local problems. These changes were balanced by an increased sense of collective responsibility and local initiative. Our findings suggest that certain aspects of political culture are susceptible to short-term change in the wake of noninstitutional interventions, such as media programs. Evidently, the mass media can influence the set of culturally available behavioral practices that citizens use—the “toolkit” of political cultural conduct.

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Diversity in Five-Factor Personality, and Five-Factor Morality

A response to Econlog Arnold Kling posting on the Five-Factor Personality Model:

I found _Personality in Adulthood, Second Edition: A Five-Factor Theory Perspective_ by McCrae and Costa to be quite readable.

I feel pretty confident that each and every human society is "tuned" for specific ratios of the five factors, and, moreover, different tuned ratios for the "vital few"/"in-group" and the "out-group". And considering Jonathan Haidt's five fundamental moral values (liberals valuing care and fairness higher than loyalty, respect, and purity, in contrast to conservatives, etc.) - I feel there is a specific ratio, in each human society, for the ranking of the five fundamental moral values, again with different ratios for the "in-group" and "out-group". In all cases, more diversity is tolerated in the "out-group", as the "in-group" have to maintain a rough consensus at all times.

A lot of "energy" is exerted maintaining genotype and social diversity in the machinery of mating pair of humans, and in the machinery of larger various human groups. It would be peculiar if this diversity was not beneficial. I think, even more than diversity, a specific tuned ratio gives the maximum benefit over a set for historical conditions, and a history of conditions changing.

I think to any company's employees: any extreme of one of the five personality factors or any extreme of one of five fundamental moral values could quickly lead to a failure mode that could put the future of the company at risk, if expressed in even a single employee handling a critical task, without any meaningful oversight. It doesn't take much imagination to make a "just-so" story for a colossal failure from an extreme in any of the ten (especially if you are trying to run a profitable business, not a kumbaya therapy group, or a frat house, or a mating pair hothouse). So a diversity would keep the whole enterprise on an even keel, to my thinking.

And the sickest organizations are the ones where politics only allows one exact personality and morality type to exist in the higher ups.

(Aside: I am interested in the mechanisms and usages of human diversity, but not aware of any book title specifically on this subject)

Bernard Chazelle on Torture

Bernard Chazelle is a left-wing blogger I read regularly.  He is a professor of Computer Science at Princeton, and writes for the blog "A Tiny Revolution".

Chazelle wrote an astonishing dissection of what the right to abortion really means morally "Is It OK to Abort Only Female Fetuses?".  Please read the whole thing.  It changed my professed view of abortion, and added great clarity.

Chazelle's new post "My Torture Memo" is not a blockbuster like his abortion post, but his view matches what I dimly comprehended myself about the morality of torture, and he wrote out his position on torture clearly and well.

These are the most important points, to me.

The best answer to the question: "Why is torture evil?" is "Because it feels evil."

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Torture should be banned unconditionally, though the possibility that it might be sometimes necessary should not be ruled out. The apparent contradiction between law and morals should come as no surprise. Legality is much coarser than morality --that's not a flaw-- and the two will inevitably clash on occasion.

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If you're so damn sure that torturing someone will save innocent lives, then you'd better be willing to go to prison for it.

I am very happy to have this writing to point to summarize my feelings about torture in the real world.  Morality affects the real world, or else it would not be morality.

Lessons from the Ming Dynasty: Can moralistic thinking lead to large system gridlock, crisis, breakdown?

I am listening to a series of lectures from Kenneth J. Hammond on Chinese History [ The Great Courses: From Yao to Mao: 5000 Years of Chinese History; Professor Kenneth J. Hammond; New Mexico State University ].  Lecture 24 describes "Gridlock and Crisis" in the Ming Dynasty.  Prof Hammond considers the philosophy of individual moralism of 16th century Chinese philospher Wang Yangming [ http://www.answers.com/topic/wang-yangming ].

Wang Yangming's later followers would use a sense of developed moralism by an outgroup to harshly judge the morals of an ingroup, with the conclusion being that the ingroup was unworthy of power, and should be frustrated at every turn, if they cannot be cast out outright.  Prof Hammond sees this as leading to gridlock and crisis, and the ultimate downfall, of the Ming Dynasty.  A more pragmatic thought that emphasizes a deferral to authority would have allowed the Dynasty to govern more effectively and well, Prof Hammond maintains.

The parallels with the modern American Republican party is clear.

I am not a supporter of current Republican obstructionism, but I think the correct interpretation is more subtle than Prof Hammond's thesis.

Personal moralistic thinking can bring clarity and action to bear against incorrect policies, and this is a very fine thing.  And personal moralistic thinking can lead people to foolish, destructive, vacuous obstructionism, and can lead people to petty "dropping out" of the system, and can lead people to petty "casting out" of opponents; vacuous obstructionism like the current Republican party after Obama's election, petty "dropping out" like Texas governor Perry's talk of succession, petty "dropping out" like militia extremism, and petty "casting out" of right-wing thinkers by the currently favored mainstream left-wing thinkers.

(How can I blame right-wing thinkers for "dropping out", if I tolerate left-wing thinkers "casting out"?  I cannot, without being inconsistent.)

Personally, I have a terrible time with over-moralizing and demonizing opponents to my viewpoint.  I am setting myself up to commit destructive, vacuous obstructionism, to commit "dropping out", to commit "casting out".  My error is not acknowledging the sincere genesis of my opponents' morality.

This is not moral relativism, or watering down moral conclusions until no action is compelled, or watering down moral conclusions until perfect inaction.  Acknowledging the sincere genesis of my opponents' morality does not imply moral relativism, because I can still strongly resist repugnant thoughts, words, and actions.  But, at least, I do not "cast out" my opponents to the ultimate wasteland, by contradicting my opponents possessing the capacity for human morality with a sincere genesis.

I will, at the first, make it clear I acknowledge the sincere genesis of their morality, even if they commit thoughts, words, actions to my disapproval, even if they commit thoughts, words, actions to my profound disgust.  I will also remind those I agree with that without acknowledging the sincere genesis of an opponent's morality, they are "casting out" that opponent with finality, and that opponent will feel justified in "dropping out", and that opponent will feel justified in actions of terrible extremism.

If I cannot, at the very least, reasonably and honestly, acknowledge the sincere genesis of an opponent's morality, I think it is better to not engage that bad actor in any way.  There are enough honest thinkers to deal with, without wasting time on the lowest.  My complete disinterest to rise to a particular person's attack should be the ultimate criticism.  I may have to construct a best construction on the intentions of an opponent, and state that where their prior actions contradicted the best construction, they were operating out of stress, or haste, or incomplete attention.

Four ideas, yesterday and today

Morality = emotion + cultural transmission + ability to abstract First, today, was listening to webcast... From EconLog, Arnold Kling:

"Moral Philosophy" "Will Wilkinson and Jesse Prinz. Highly recommended. You could easily spend four years at an Ivy League college and not have a class as interesting as this one."

Webcast on : bloggingheads.tv

• @13:20 Jesse Prinz, "'Emotions are the middle ground between _action_ and _thought_"
• @28:38 Jesse Prinz: "morality is inevitable, but morality is not universal
• @45:00 Morality = emotion + cultural transmission + ability to abstract

OK, "Morality = emotion + cultural transmission + ability to abstract". Then yesterday was thinking about three things: Politics & Societial Prescriptive Morality:

• what if you list the things that really disturb
• if you confess that, people will say you are: elitist, practically an enemy combatant, wrong, unreasonable
• you could lose your: livelyhood, carreer, friends, recognition
• in Third World countries, you could lose your life, if you are on the wrong side of political conflicts
• the end result - consider working outside of public politics

Fame & Publicity:

• what if you contrast who does and who does not deserve positive fame and publicity
• if you confess that, people will say you are: elitist, wrong, unreasonable
• the end result - consider working outside of public notoriety

but then I was thinking, if morality is tied to emotion, it is not easy to control.

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You owe it to the world to be Progressive, Happy, Effective:

1. Happy, Effective and Progressive
2. Unhappy, Uneffective and Progressive
3. Happy, Effective and Reactive

When we consider people who are Progressive, but also Unhappy and Uneffective, we are supposed to see that they just need help to expand their responses, and not to criticize them, because they are just doing the best they can. But don't people who are Reactive deserve the same understanding?